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Pakistan’s hard misplacement and the politics of regional identity 
Dr Wali Aslam 
Associate Professor in International Relations 




Pakistan has been a misplaced state from its birth. Created as a separate homeland for the 
Muslims of the Subcontinent, it considers itself to be a misfit in a multi-faith, South Asian 
region dominated by India. This paper analyses Pakistan’s misplaced identity utilising the 
layered model of identity change. The model helps us focus on various foreign-policy roles 
that Pakistan performs. The deepest layer (most resistant to change) denotes Pakistan’s 
identity as a sovereign and independent state, which outlines the roles of an alliance partner 
and a nuclear power. The middle layer represents the identity of Pakistan as an insecure state 
with the roles of a ‘chancer’ state, a regional intermediary and the regional leader. The top 
(and least sedimented) layer points to Pakistan’s identity as a Muslim state, giving birth to the 
hoped-for roles of the leader of the Muslim world, an Islamic crusader, and the defender of 
the faith. However, Pakistan has been unable to gain acknowledgement for these roles either 
in South Asia or elsewhere. The country’s attempts to reimagine a cognitive home for itself 
in the Middle East have also not come to fruition. It continues to be a misplaced state, 
cognitively dissociated from its geographic home. 
 
Keywords: Pakistan, role, Arabisation, identity, subcontinent 
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1. Introduction  
Pakistan is the most misplaced state in the South Asian region and one of the most 
misplaced states in the world. Though located in South Asia, Pakistan’s trade connections 
with its neighbours (and the rest of the region) are minimal. Its exports to South Asia 
accounted for just under 13% of its total exports in 2016 (World Integrated Trade Solution, 
2016). Pakistan’s trade figures with India (a global economic giant) are also very small, with 
imports and exports accounting for 0.35% and 0.17%, respectively, of Pakistan’s global trade 
figures (World Integrated Trade Solution, 2016). Similar to other cases of hard misplacement, 
the country’s citizenry is almost completely cut off from its immediate neighbours as well as 
the wider South Asian region. That is complicated by the fact that it is near impossible for a 
Pakistani citizen to obtain an Indian or Afghanistan visa as both countries suspect Pakistan 
for its sponsorship of terrorism. The number of Pakistanis visiting Iran, consisting 
mostly of Shia pilgrims, is slightly higher. However, reciprocal visits by Iranians to Pakistan 
are few and far between.  
 
A country almost completely cut off from South Asia, Pakistan has occasionally 
attempted to find a cognitive home in the Persian Gulf . A large number of Pakistanis visit 
Gulf destinations such as Dubai, Mecca, Medina and Istanbul every year. The closeness 
between Pakistan and the Persian Gulf can be explained through religious and socio-cultural 
linkages between the two sides. However, that closeness does not make the Gulf countries 
welcome Pakistan as one of their own.  
 
Like any other country, Pakistan also performs several roles that are rooted in different 
layers of its identity. However, this paper argues that most of these roles have not received 
acknowledgement from Pakistan’s neighbouring countries, the Muslim world or the wider 
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international community. That has led to Pakistan emerging as a case of hard misplacement: 
appearing as a misfit within its geographical region but unable to find a permanent cognitive 
home elsewhere in the world.  
 
The paper is structured in the following way: relying on the layered model of Hagstrom & 
Gustafsson (2015: 6), we study three layers of Pakistani identity, from the most deeply rooted 
(most sedimented) to the most superficial one (least sedimented). The second section studies 
Pakistan’s most deeply rooted identity linked to its status as a sovereign and independent 
state. That identity gives birth to several roles (e.g. an alliance partner or a responsible 
nuclear power). The third section looks at Pakistan as an insecure state, which leads it to 
adopt the roles of a ‘chancer’ state, regional intermediary or a regional leader. Pakistan’s 
Islamic identity is seen as the top-level layer and it is discussed in the fourth section. That 
section examines Pakistan’s roles of Islamic crusader, defender of faith or the leader of the 
Muslim world. The conclusion asserts that Pakistan’s failure to gain acknowledgement of any 
of its roles makes its leaders depict it as an exceptional, sui genera, case. We conclude that 
Pakistan’s misplacement is set to continue, being sparked by, and resulting in, a lack of 
association between its regional and cognitive homes. 
 
2. The concept of misplaced statehood:1: 
Before we study Pakistan’s hard misplacement, it would beis useful to make links with 
the conceptual paper of the Special Issue to understand the phenomenon of misplaced 
statehood (Aslam et al. 2020). Every state iIn the world, generally states believe that they 
belongs to a specific location on the world map or to a region. Thisat sense of belonging is 
                                                 
1 This section is composed of the excerpts from the provides a brief overview of the theoretical framework 
concerning the phenomenon of misplaced statehood. For a comprehensive exposition of the phenomenon, see 
theoretical paper of this Special Issue. For more, see Aslam et al. 2020 in this issue.   
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 as relational as it is material or geographic (Aslam et al. 2020, 2). However, 
we also observe that certain states appear to be misfits in the regions where they are located. 
There can be several reasons for this. 
Perhaps these states feel that, 
cognitively speaking, they belong in a part of the world that is different from their 
geographical location.  There can also be situations where their neighbouring states 
treat them as ‘aliens’ (Aslam et al. 2020, 2). 
 
When it comes to formally conceptualising this phenomenon, we consider a state to 
be misplaced when it faces a dissonance (at the cognitive level) between its physical 
geographic location and the cognitive location where it considers itself to be located. This 
dissonance commonly results in a mismatch between the way a state perceives its national 
aspirations and how other states in the region view it (Aslam et al. 2020, 7). This mismatch 
between the Self and Others’ perceptions is often manifested through the roles that Self and 
Others play or attempt to play. It is not just a state’s own national identity forces that lead it 
to being misplaced. The part played by the Others’ actions, which are linked to the external 
identity dimension, is also critical to learning about a state’s misplacedness in a region.  
 
One of the key characteristics of a misplaced state relates to the incongruity between Self 
and Other’s perceptions in a certain region that comes into being through the interaction of 
role and counter-role. We often witness how misplaced states experience the processes of 
‘role differentiation’ that can just as easily be initiated from outside these states as from 
within (Aslam et al. 2020, 8). The phenomenon of misplaced statehood is closely related to 
the recognition claims that remain unacknowledged. The extent to which misplaced states 
experience such claims vary due to many factors, such as historical conflicts or trauma a state 
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may have faced (e.g. colonialism). That is why it is important to consider how the degree of 
such states’ ‘misplacedness’ varies. We can locate misplaced states on a spectrum ranging 
from ‘well-placed’ states at one end to extremely misplaced states at the other end. States 
situated in between these two extremes experience ‘soft misplacement’ (Aslam et al. 2020, 
11). 
We characterise Pakistan as an example of hard misplacement (Israel and apartheid 
South Africa are some of the other examples of such states). These states are known 
for persistently voicing dissatisfaction with their regional 
location; they try hard to distance themselves from their geographical regions. We assert 
that in such cases ‘misplacement is not primarily reflected through mere manifestations of 
cognitive aspiration but can also affect interstate relations at a deeper, fundamental level to 
the extent that regressive regional relations become institutionalised through diplomatic and 
even military security practices’ (Aslam et al. 2020, 13). A cursory glance at the history of 
such states reveals that such extreme examples are rare, and 
they experience a complete cognitive disconnect from the geographical region they are 
located in. 
 
 This project relies on Hagstrom & Gustafsson’s (2015) ‘layered model’ to develop an 
analytical framework through which to analyse misplaced states. We assert that change and 
continuity can be best understood if identity is viewed as layered ‘and [is] simultaneously 
constituted on mutually interacting levels of intersubjective meaning making’ (Hagstrom & 
Gustafsson 2015: 6). Hagstrom & Gustafsson (2015: 6) contend that ‘identity change in the 
less institutionalized layers interact and builds upon layers that are more institutionalized.’ 
More institutionalised layers are more ‘“solidly sedimented and more difficult for actors to 
politicise and change”’ (Wæver 2002: 31 quoted in Hagstrom & Gustafsson 2015: 6). In 
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other words, ‘more sedimented layers of identity construction can enable different identity 
constructs in less sedimented layers and even sharp turns in identity construction, but changes 
in the latter can also affect the former’ (Hagstrom & Gustafsson 2015: 6). 
The ‘layered model’ is useful as it helps us observe how the location of roles related 
to misplacement as well as the role behavior related to this phenomenon unfurl (Aslam et al. 
2020, 25). Self and Others interact in these layers, and such an interaction is critical to 
understanding ‘role and counterrole interaction’ that helps in mapping the phenomenon of 
misplacement. We utilize role theory instead of the concept of identity to build our analytical 
framework; the latter does not help us understand motivational dispositions of an actor 
whereas roles symbolise the external faces of an actor’s identity. The three-layered model of 
identity mentioned earlier helps us understand the processes of role-location and the way 
certain states perform different roles in different settings and situations. 
 
3. Base layer: Pakistan as a sovereign and independent state 
 
Pakistan came into being in 1947 as a result of the partition of the Indian subcontinent. 
Since its foundation, its leadership has held that India has attempted to weaken Pakistan. As 
President Ayub said in 1967: 
[T]he cause of our major problems is India’s inability to reconcile herself to our existence as a 
sovereign, independent state. The Indian attitude can be explained only in pathological terms. 
The Indian leaders have a deep hatred for the Muslims… From the beginning, India was 
determined to make things difficult for us… it threat[ened] [the] diversion and stoppage of 
river waters flowing into our territory. Contrary to all agreements and principles India 
forcibly occupied a major part of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and concentrated her 
forces there, thus posing a constant threat to our security. At the back of it all was India’s 
ambition to absorb Pakistan or turn her into a satellite state (Khan 1967, 115). 
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Pakistan was also challenged by Afghanistan in 1947, which believed that the former 
was created on its territory. Similarly, China also refused to acknowledge Pakistan’s 
sovereignty over certain territories in the north (such as Hunza) from the beginning of the 
1950s. It claimed that their rulers had long acknowledged Chinese suzerainty over these areas 
(Small 2015, 21). 
 
Domestically, the state lacked a large industrial base, depriving it of the capital 
needed to shore up its defence. Two of its four ethnic groups (Baluchis and Pashtuns) had 
loyalties beyond its boundaries and identified little with the new state (Zaidi 2009, 37). These 
challenges laid the foundation of an obsession with its sovereignty and territorial integrity 
from the very beginning. Due to its traumatic birth and difficulties with its neighbours (some 
of which continue to this day), Pakistanis seldom identify with the rest of South Asia. As 
President Ayub (quoted in Zaidi 2010, 2) stated in 1961: 
 
Pakistan is in a particular position of having cultural, historical and spiritual ties with the 
Middle East, Europe and North America. This rich heritage is itself a national asset and 
provides an ideal starting point for teaching international understanding and a realisation of 
our membership in a comity of nations. 
 
A key role crafted by Pakistan to ensure its sovereignty and territorial integrity was 
that of being an alliance partner. Given India’s tilt towards the USSR during the 1950s, 
Pakistan looked towards the West to find allies. In a visit to the US in 1961, President Ayub 
portrayed the country as ‘the only people who will stand by [the US]’ if needed (quoted in 
Talbot 2009, 172). It joined the Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation and Central Treaty 
Organisation (CENTO) (Moskalenko 1974, 275). Its leaders believed that Pakistan was 
Commented [A22]: Should this read ‘sovereingty’? 
Commented [A23R22]: We should leave it as it is because 
China did not exercise actual sovereignty over that area. It 
was informal control in which the rulers pledged obedience to 
the Chinese. That control is better captured through this word. 
Formatted: Font: Not Bold
Commented [A24]: Should it be emboldened? 
Commented [A25R24]: It should not be. I have changed it.  
8 
 
‘compelled’ to join these alliances because it was ‘involved in a bitter and prolonged struggle 
for her very existence and survival’ (Khan 1967, 116). 
 
Pakistan’s conception of itself as an alliance partner has not been validated by its Western 
allies, nor by China, and none of these have ever provided help in its wars with India. Fears 
over its security led Pakistan to strive for nuclear capability in the 1970s. It emerged as an 
overt nuclear power in 1998. However, the country failed to seek acknowledgement for that 
role either from the international community. It was placed under severe sanctions after the 
tests. Where the West has recently acknowledged India as a responsible nuclear power 
(visible from the signing of a civil-nuclear deal between the US and India in 2006), the case 
of Pakistan is different. After the disclosures in the early 2000s that it had supplied nuclear 
technology to Libya and North Korea, Pakistan has been viewed with serious mistrust by 
the international community (especially the great powers) and its legitimacy as a responsible 
nuclear power has been in doubt.  
 
4. Middle layer: Pakistan as an insecure state  
 
Pakistan was born an insecure state in 1947 (Fair 2010). Its leadership has asserted 
throughout history that Pakistanis have been the victims of the ‘evil’ designs of Hindus and 
their Western masters. In the discussions concerning the pre-partition India, school textbooks 
in Pakistan portray Hindus as in cahoots with the British rulers ‘to humiliate 
and suppress their Muslim subjects by all means at their disposal. The [British] showered 
favours upon the Hindus, while they denied all opportunities for education, employment, 
wealth and progress to the Muslims’ (Saigol 2005, 1018). A recent Pakistan Studies textbook 
for undergraduate students (quoted in Mohammad-Arif 2005, 151) asserts that the Muslims 
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of the Subcontinent created Pakistan in the face of a united opposition by all major 
communities: 
 
The Hindus and the Sikhs accelerated their pace for Muslim mass killing. So, when Pakistan 
emerged on the map of the world, communal riots were on the increase: Religion was 
employed to justify the raging storm of resentment and hatred and to stimulate and glorify the 
atrocities against the followers of Islam. 
 
Many Pakistanis believe that the British and the Indians colluded to deprive Pakistan 
of military hardware and economic resources, ensuring that the new state started its life on a 
weak footing (Sayeed 1964). The fact that Afghanistan was the only state that voted against 
Pakistan’s membership of the UN further exacerbated Pakistan’s insecurity. The victim 
identity got a further boost after East Pakistan became independent after a bloody civil war 
between the two wings in 1971. A Civics textbook for Class IX (quoted in Saigol 2005, 
1027) shows it clearly:  
 
India used the insurgents and miscreants and started a poisonous campaign against 
Pakistan all over the world. When India saw that it is achieving its nefarious designs, 
it attacked Pakistan.…. So, finally East Pakistan became separate from Pakistan due 
to treason of Awami League (the party that created Bangladesh), and the Indian 
aggression. The whole Pakistani nation was tormented and writhing in the pain of this 
deep wound. 
 
The book also specifies that the Indian plot to dismember Pakistan in 1971 had 
‘British sympathy’ (Saigol 2005,1028). Another textbook for high schoolers claims that 
‘hiding the story of his two-century old sins, atrocities, and pillage,’ the Hindu ‘punished 
10 
 
innocent West Pakistanis for sins they had not committed’ (quoted in Hoodbhoy and Nayyar 
1985, 174). 
 
Most Pakistanis believe that Indian animosity towards Pakistan continues until the 
present day, as India ‘constantly endeavor[s] to harm Pakistan’ (a textbook quoted in Durrani 
and Dunne 2009, 226). That identity of victimhood imparts a sense of a mission to Pakistan 
as one newspaper asserted that ‘[i]f the main concern of the Christian West is the 
containment of Chinese Communism, the main concern of Muslim Pakistan is the 
containment of militarist and militant Hinduism’ (quoted in Syeed 1964, 746). A Pakistani 
leader declared that the  
 
[t]hreat from India to our security and existence was both real and constant. Indian 
efforts in the field of foreign policy were all directed towards one aim, the isolation of 
Pakistan and its disintegration. We had done all that we could to convince India that 
we wanted to live in peace with her, but India could not accept the existence of a 
strong and independent Muslim State next door (Khan 1967, 117). 
 
Importantly, none of Pakistan’s allies came to its rescue in its different wars with 
India in 1948, 1965, 1971 and 1999 (Fair 2010). These developments made Pakistan deeply 
suspicious of its neighbours, the great powers and even the countries friendly to it. This 
Pakistani insecurity explains a number of roles that Pakistan has adopted in order to mitigate 
against this insecurity. These include the role of a ‘chancer’ state, the role of a regional 
intermediary and the role of the regional leader. Below we examine these roles and study the 
extent to which these roles have been granted legitimacy by its neighbours and beyond.  
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Given its insecurity, Pakistan has often adopted the role of a chancer state – a state 
that has played double games on several occasions which has deepened its misplacement. For 
example, it chose to side with the US in 2001 when it decided to invade Afghanistan, but its 
ongoing alliance with the Afghan Taliban continues to concern the international community. 
Every American administration since the invasion of Afghanistan has criticised Pakistan for 
providing sanctuary to those hampering international efforts to stabilize the country.  
 
Similarly, Pakistan has been active in sponsoring Islamist militants in Indian-occupied 
Kashmir for decades. Haqqani (2005, 240) asserts that ‘if forced to summarize the key traits 
[of a Hindu]’ in the Pakistani mindset, ‘then the most appropriate would be a “presumptuous, 
persistent and devious” [person]. [Accordingly], the description of Hindus as devious 
justifie[s] dealing with them with similar deviousness’. Playing the role of a chancer state 
allows it to hedge its bets in what it sees as an uncertain and dangerous neighbourhood. That 
role is often condemned by the international community as an example of irresponsible 
behaviour. That has had a negative impact on Pakistan’s role location process in a region 
outside South Asia. Civil society groups in Pakistan have also criticised the country’s support 
of terrorist groups as it often results in a blowback within Pakistan. This highlights the 
state/society disjuncture in the country, typical of misplaced states.  
 
Whilst the country does not openly talk about its support of terrorists, it does try to 
portray itself as a regional intermediary between the US and a variety of militant groups 
active in Afghanistan. But that role has also failed to gain acknowledgement from Pakistan’s 
neighbours (Afghanistan and India) and the United States, none of whom trust it to be an 
impartial stakeholder genuinely interested in ridding the region of terrorism. Instead, Pakistan 
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has often been shunned in different contacts between the Taliban and the United States (BBC 
2018). 
 
Suspicion of India’s intention has also led Pakistan to occasionally assert its regional 
leadership role in South Asia albeit without much success. The cancellation of the latest 
South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit, which was scheduled to 
be held in Islamabad in November 2016, is quite instructive in this regard (Rediff 2016). The 
summit was seen by Pakistan as an opportunity to brandish its leadership credentials in South 
Asia. However, India pulled out of the meeting after the September 2016 Uri attack in 
Kashmir that targeted its security forces, blaming Pakistan for being behind the incident. 
India’s withdrawal was followed by Sri Lanka, Maldives, Bhutan, Afghanistan and 
Bangladesh. Almost every country cited terrorism in South Asia as a reason for withdrawing 
from the meeting – although, like India, they did not blame Pakistan directly for supporting 
terrorism. The incident left Pakistan isolated once again, depriving it of any legitimacy for its 
bid to appear as a regional leader and depicting its hard misplacement. 
 
5. Top layer: Pakistan – A Muslim state 
 
Where there is a broad agreement among different stakeholders in Pakistan regarding its 
identities as a sovereign – as well as a victim – state, the country’s identity as an Islamic state 
is undoubtedly the most contested and least sedimented. That contestation started before the 
creation of the state itself and continues through today. That is why we have specified it as 
the ‘top’ layer in Hagstrom & Gustafsson’s (2015: 6) layered model of identity change. As 
this identity is least sedimented, different stakeholders have the opportunity to contest it more 
than the other identities, keeping open the avenues for change.  
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Pakistan was created as a home for the region’s Muslims and it was declared an Islamic 
republic in 1956. Studying the role of Islam in building the state of Pakistan, Khalid bin 
Sayeed (1968) notes how the distrust in citizens and undemocratic orientation of the leaders 
led them to use religion as a uniting ideology. This was done at the cost of stressing a 
national identity through representative democracy. Pakistan’s national identity was primarily 
defined in religious terms. The task of establishing a single national identity in those terms 
was given precedence over laying strong foundations of democracy in the country. The result 
was a longer-term Islamization of the country (Abbot, 1963, 193). Sayeed notes how Pakistan 
was unwilling to reconcile the cultural and political outlook between its eastern and 
western wings and the ruling elite believed that religion would provide answers to the 
pressing but controversial questions along with being the glue that would link the two wings 
together (Williams, 1962, 283). It was not the uneducated masses but the inability of the 
educated masses to reconcile the differences among themselves which led to the distrust 
between E ast and West Pakistan. In the absence of a common bond, the only uniting 
factor was religion which was overemphasised. (Binder, 1962, 590).  
 
The cultural differences between the two parts of the country were so vast that the 
leadership of the Muslim League had considered the idea of creating two Muslim states in the 
subcontinent instead of one (Sayeed 1960, 114-115; Harnetty 1968, 471). East and West 
Pakistan were inhabited by several ‘strongly self-conscious groups’ and in the absence of a 
deeply rooted historical tradition of the rule of law, it was inevitable that Punjabi dominance 
appeared quickly on the horizon instead of an equitable institution of federalism (Bagley 
1961, 439). 
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The project of Pakistan was a project to protect the interests of the Punjabi and Sindhi 
landowners disguised in the garb of Islam (Syeed 1968; Bagley 1961, 440). It depended on 
the clerics to ensure a wider appeal for it among the Muslim masses who found the idea of an 
Islamic state attractive. After the creation of the country, the leadership realised that the 
prescriptions of the clerics concerning the new state clashed with the idea of a modern and 
industrialized country that could accommodate multiple cultures (Sayeed 1968: Bagley 1961, 
440). East Pakistan suffered from shortages of decent land to cultivate and did not receive a 
fair share of resources from West Pakistan. Instead of responding to the demands of 
respect and a fair sharing of resources, the leaders turned to Islam which led to the breakup of 
the country. In the remaining country, the distance between the rulers and the ruled kept on 
widening and democracy has failed to take roots while cynicism and corruption have 
been on the rise (Bagley 1961, 440). According to some, Pakistan’s Islamic identity was 
over-emphasised to resist the Western onslaught and to deny the Western dominance of a 
post-colonial state (Sayeed 1995: Esposito 1997, 431). The rise of Pakistan is compared to 
the rise of Turkey. Where the latter sought to abandon the political framework, if not the 
spirit, of Islam, the former chose to look to the faith to construct a state and unify a disparate 
set of people (Smith 1951; Fakhry 1955, 336). 
 
Pakistan has often tried to adopt the role of the leader of the Muslim world. Its political 
elites believe that it is uniquely qualified for that role because it was the first country to be 
created in the name of Islam. The exceptional nature of Pakistan’s identity is often 
highlighted (a key feature of misplaced states). The first Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat 
Ali Khan (quoted in Rizvi 1983, 58) said that the unity of the Muslims worldwide was key to 
the accomplishment of the mission for which Pakistan was created: 
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Our relations with the Muslim countries should not only be friendly, but brotherly, 
and that they should be made stronger everyday because the mission of Pakistan can 
achieve its success only when we make other Muslim countries join it.  
 
In the decade after independence, Pakistan conducted the groundwork of a permanent 
multilateral body for uniting and representing the world’s Muslims (Rizvi 1983, 49). Prime 
Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto also organised a major summit of the world’s Muslim leaders in 
1974 in the eastern city of Lahore. Pakistan has also used its nuclear capability to persuade 
the rest of the Muslim world that it has substantial capability to be their leader (a typical 
feature of a misplaced state). However, these efforts to propose a new role for Pakistan have 
been rejected by the other nations and bodies involved. The country’s inability to obtain 
validation for a mission believed by some to be key to its foundation has exacerbated its 
misplacement. Referring to Pakistan’s overtures to the anti-imperialist movements of the 
Middle East soon after gaining independence, Rizvi (1983, 50) argues that  
 
Islam did not play the same strategic role in the nationalist movements of most 
Middle Eastern states as was the case in Pakistan. For most of them it was a straight 
struggle against a colonial ruler. They were not a minority community and did not feel 
that their social, political and economic interests were threatened by a non-Muslim 
majority. Thus, Islam did not appear prominently in their struggle for nationhood. It 
was not the raison d'être of their state and nation.  
 
Furthermore, the role of the ‘leader of the Muslim world’ has often been championed 
by Saudi Arabia and post-revolutionary Iran. Some countries such as Egypt were suspicious 
of Pakistan’s stance from the beginning and believed that it was performing that role at the 
Commented [A58]: Should this be italicised? 
Commented [A59R58]: Not quite.  
16 
 
behest of Western powers to neutralise revolutionary Muslim states (Rizvi 1983, 51). It was 
hard for Pakistan’s bid to be acknowledged as the leader of the Muslim world when its 
immediate (Muslim) neighbour, Afghanistan, laid claims to its very sovereign territory.  
 
Instead of Pakistan, leaders like Nasser (Egypt) and Seokarno (Indonesia) ‘found 
greater identity of views with Nehru and developed closer ties with India than with the 
leaders of Pakistan’ (Rizvi 1983, 51). The mismatch in role expectations (between Pakistan 
and the Muslim countries) were at their starkest when Pakistan found it difficult to 
understand ‘why a number of Arab states did not take its side in its disputes with India – a 
non-Muslim state’ in the mid-1960s (Rizvi 1983, 51).  
 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 made Pakistan utilise its Muslim identity 
to adopt a new role of an Islamic crusader. Portraying the Mujahideen as the soldiers of 
Islam, a Pakistani general (quoted in Small 2015, 79) declared at the time that 
 
We are fighting a jihad, and this is the first Islamic international brigade in the 
modern era. The Communists have their international brigades, the West has NATO, 
why can’t the Muslims unite and form a common front?  
 
Though Afghanistan was the primary theatre for this Islamic crusade in the 1980s, the 
dispute over Kashmir was also repainted in Islamic terms (Delvoie 1995/6, 142). The role of 
Islamic crusader obtained initial acceptance from countries within the Muslim world and 
beyond due to their compulsion to disrupt the flow of communism. After the Soviet 
withdrawal, however, Pakistan’s links with Islamist militants have been seen suspiciously by 
the rest of the world. The events of 11 September 2001 and the ensuing global war on 
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terrorism took all legitimacy away from Pakistan’s conception of itself as an Islamic crusader 
country, followed by subsequent global rejection of that role. 
 
Pakistan’s Islamic identity has also led it to often adopt a defender of the faith role. 
Soon after its creation, it moved ‘aggressively’ to champion the causes of Muslims anywhere 
in the world and to promote Muslim brotherhood (Rizvi 1983, 49). In the 1950s, Pakistan 
supported its fellow Muslims in places like Indonesia and Tunisia, who were fighting against 
colonialism. In the 1990s, Pakistan engaged in significant diplomatic efforts at the UN and 
the OIC to highlight the plight of the Bosnian Muslims affected by the Yugoslav wars. The 
country offered several million dollars in aid to affected Bosnians and welcomed several 
hundred of them to find sanctuary in Pakistan (Delvoi 1995/6, 141). The country has always 
been very active in supporting various UN peacekeeping missions in the Muslim world (such 
as Somalia, Bosnia), a fact very much rooted in Pakistan’s Islamic identity in its conception 
of its role as the defender of the world’s Muslims. 
 
A focus on its Islamic identity helps understand Pakistan’s bid to look for a cognitive 
home in the Arabian peninsula instead of a “Hindu dominated” South Asia. Commentators 
have described it as the country’s attempts to Arabise its identity (Rahman 2014). However, 
the states and the people of the Gulf tend to look down upon Pakistani citizens, especially the 
migrant workers. Such reactions heighten Pakistan’s misplacement as it is unable to 
get the Middle Eastern states to treat it as one of their own. 
 
Pakistan’s Islamic identity is a topic of heated debate at home and abroad. It is not as 
sedimented as the identities of a ‘sovereign’ or an ‘insecure state’ discussed in the 
preceding two sections. Some leaders have attempted to distance the country from its Islamic 
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identity and to portray it as a modern and enlightened state (Musharraf 2006). As Delvoi 
(1995/6, 146) asserts  
 
There have, of course, always been a number of politicians, officials, and scholars 
ready to remind participants in seminars and conferences that Islamic ideology and 
Muslim solidarity are no substitute for military and economic strength in defending 
and promoting the nation's interests, and to point to Pakistan's continuing heavy 
dependence on the West and Japan for trade, investment, and aid.  
 
Liberal sections of the society refer to the speeches of the country’s founding father 
who, they believe, did not want Pakistan to become an Islamic republic. A year before the 
creation of Pakistan, Jinnah (quoted in Hoodbhoy and Nayyar 1985, 171) had said that ‘the 
new state would be a modern democratic state with sovereignty resting in the people and the 
members of the new nation having equal rights of citizenship regardless of their religion, 
caste or creed.’ He also asked: ‘What are we fighting for? What are we aiming at? It is not 
theocracy, nor a theocratic state.’  
 
Commentators assert that Pakistan was created to give freedom to Muslims to lead their lives 
according to their distinct culture and not to become an ‘Islamist’ state. As the country’s 
Education Policy of 1998 specified that Islam was the only common feature among 
Pakistan’s inhabitants and its utilisation was in making obvious the country’s ‘sole identity’ 
(quoted in Durrani and Dunne 2009: 222). Pakistan’s Islamic identity remains a topic of 
contestation among identity entrepreneurs who continue to disagree over the question of 
whether Pakistan should be a ‘normal’ state or an Islamic state with associated missions. The 
answer to the question of where Pakistan belongs depends on the way the respondent looks at 
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the role of Islam in Pakistan’s internal and external orientation. Though the Pakistan 
movement succeeded in helping the Muslims of the subcontinent achieve a country of their 
own, the same solution could not be applied for the country’s later problems. Instead of 
facing the reality, the country’s leadership opted in favour of a greater doze of Islam as a 
solution of every problem trying to enhance Pakistan’s ‘virtual relocation’ (Pande 2013, 136) 
closer to the Middle East. This focus on Islam has deterred Pakistan from developing a 
distinctive identity based on its geographical location and the history of its people (Malik 
1969, 641). 
 
The lack of clarity regarding the role of Islam in the working of Pakistan has been a matter of 
discussion since its creation. Interestingly, the project of Pakistan was inherently a project of 
Westernized upper and middle-class leaders of the Muslim League who wanted a separate 
country on the basis of economic as well as cultural motives (Sayeed 1968; Bagley 1961, 
440). That led them to demand a separate homeland for Muslims but inwardly they wanted a 
secular Pakistan. However, establishing the institutions of the country on a secular basis 
would have rendered the need for a separate homeland for Muslims redundant.  
 
Islam was a force that brought Pakistan into being and which held it together (except for 
the separation of East Pakistan) and the processes of state building were all about finding 
social and political embodiment of Islam (Smith 1951: Fakhry 1955, 337). However, it has 
not been clear whether Pakistanis want the notion of Islam to be an ideal which they must 
ascribe to (despite not knowing what its content would be) or what an Islamic Pakistan would 
look like as a country. The latter version may look towards identities other than Islam to 
consolidate the processes of state-building (Fakhry 1955, 337). On the other hand, the 
problems with perpetually pursuing the ideal of an Islamic state makes different groups 
within Pakistan think that they need a constant reinterpretation and ‘reconstruction’ of Islam. 
Commented [A68]:  
Commented [A69]: This part of the sentence is unclear, it 
seems like there is a missing word 
Commented [A70R69]: I have clarified it now 
20 
 
The focus remains on the achievement of an ‘ideal’ Islamic Pakistan that remains perpetually 
misplaced at the cost of building a modern state that has answers for crucial questions 




Pakistan was created as a separate homeland for the region’s Muslims and it will be 
difficult for it to find a natural cognitive home in a multi-faith South Asia. But its efforts to 
find a cognitive home in the Middle East have also been unsuccessful. In addition, Pakistan 
has been unable to find a sympathetic audience in Europe. Due to the country’s hard 
misplacement and its inability to find a cognitive home anywhere in the world, the leadership 
portrays it as a sui genera case that has an exceptionalist orientation. As President Ayub 
asserted in 1967 (quoted in Jha 1970, 136): 
 
India’s neutralism was at best a posture of sitting on the fence and seeing how best it 
could take advantage of both sides; at worst it was a kind of hypocrisy and a 
subterfuge attempt to act ‘big’ and to create a cover for the expansion of her 
influence. We entertain no such illusions. Our approach is essentially intended to 
conserve our resources and to cut our commitment.  
 
Pakistan’s chief problems include ‘how to make it a viable state’ and ‘how to make it an 
Islamic state’. That means that an Islamic Pakistan could be a democratic Pakistan only if the 
central tenets of its democracy are in conformity with the teachings of Islam (Smith 1951; 
Jaschke 1955, 67). Though there has been an agreement on the role of Islam, it is not clear 
which interpretation of Islam will be followed. Most Pakistanis followed a more pacific sufi 
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interpretation of Islam which is closer to the norms of the Indian civilisation (Jaschke 1955, 
68). In times of difficulties, the country has decided that the answers to its problems were not 
only more Islam but the ‘right’ kind of Islam which, according to some, resembled the Saudi 
version of wahabi Islam.  
 
There is limited appetite either among the masses or the state’s elites in Pakistan to 
belong to the South Asian region given the lack of desire from within and lack of legitimacy 
from outside. Zaidi (2009, 37) contends that if Pakistan were to accept and embrace the idea 
of South Asia ‘wholeheartedly’ the ‘rationale for Partition and for an independent homeland 
for Muslims, would be undermined, or at least, questioned.’ Where, for instance, Israel is 
often able to find some global recognition in the absence of regional recognition, Pakistan has 
neither. If the past is the best predictor of the future, this misplacement is set to continue.  
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